Charming Kitten Resurfaces: Targeting US Financial Sector and Global Activists
- Actor Motivations: Espionage
- Attack Vectors: Spear Phishing
- Attack Complexity: Medium
- Threat Risk: Low Impact/Low Probability
Threat Overview
In early October 2018, the Iranian-linked hacker group Charming Kitten initiated phishing attacks targeting U.S. financial institutions, possibly in response to new sanctions against Iran. These attacks expanded to include civil and human rights activists, political figures, and journalists in Iran and the West. The group used sophisticated phishing techniques, such as fake security alerts and deceptive Google Drive links, to gather sensitive information and credentials. They also employed real-time credential verification and 2-step verification code interception. Evidence suggests the attackers used VPNs and proxies, but real IP addresses traced back to Iran were also identified. The campaign's methods and targets are consistent with previous activities attributed to Charming Kitten.
Detected Targets
| Type | Description | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Sector | Human Rights | Verified |
| Sector | Journalists | Verified |
| Sector | Political | Verified |
| Region | Israel | Verified |
| Region | United States | Verified |
Extracted IOCs
- account-profile-users[.]info
- accounts-support[.]services
- broadcast-news[.]info
- broadcastnews[.]pro
- com-identifier-servicelog[.]info
- com-identifier-servicelog[.]name
- com-identifier-userservicelog[.]com
- com-messengercenters[.]name
- com-messengersaccount[.]name
- confirmation-service[.]info
- confirm-identification[.]name
- confirm-identity[.]net
- confirm-session-identification[.]info
- confirm-session-identifier[.]info
- confirm-verification-process[.]systems
- continue-session-identifier[.]info
- customer-recovery[.]info
- customize-identity[.]info
- documentofficupdate[.]info
- documentsfilesharing[.]cloud
- document-share[.]info
- email-delivery[.]info
- identifier-sessions-mailactivityid[.]site
- invitation-to-messenger[.]space
- login-users-account[.]site
- mobilecontinue[.]network
- mobile-messengerplus[.]network
- my-scribdinc[.]online
- notificationapp[.]info
- podcastmedia[.]online
- recoveryusercustomer[.]info
- session-management[.]info
- sessions-identifier-memberemailid[.]network
- support-recoverycustomers[.]services
- us2-mail-login-profile[.]site
- users-account[.]site
- accounts.confirm-verification-process[.]systems
- activatecodeoption.ddns[.]net
- aol.account-profile-users[.]info
- books.com-identifier-servicelog[.]name
- broadcastnews.ddns[.]net
- broadcastpopuer.ddns[.]net
- confirm.mobile-messengerplus[.]network
- documents.accounts-support[.]services
- documents.mobile-messengerplus[.]network
- document.support-recoverycustomers[.]services
- live.account-profile-users[.]info
- mb.sessions-identifier-memberemailid[.]network
- mobile.confirm-identification[.]name
- mobile-sessionid.customize-identity[.]info
- mobiles-sessionid.customize-identity[.]info
- myyahoo.ddns[.]net
- onlinemessenger.com-identifier-servicelog[.]name
- securemail.mobile-messengerplus[.]network
- services.confirm-identification[.]name
- session-identifier-webservice.mobilecontinue[.]network
- sessions.mobile-messengerplus[.]network
- signin.account-profile-users[.]info
- us2.login-users-account[.]site
- noreply.customermails@gmail[.]com
- notifications.mailservices@gmail[.]com
- 178[.]162.132.65
- 190[.]2.154.34
- 190[.]2.154.35
- 190[.]2.154.36
- 190[.]2.154.38
- 213[.]227.139.148
- 31[.]2.213.18
- 46[.]166.151.211
- 51[.]38.107.113
- 51[.]38.87.64
- 51[.]38.87.65
- 51[.]68.185.96
- 54[.]37.241.221
- 54[.]38.144.250
- 54[.]38.144.251
- 54[.]38.144.252
- 85[.]17.127.172
- 85[.]17.127.173
- 85[.]17.127.174
- 85[.]17.127.175
- 89[.]198.179.103
- 95[.]211.189.45
- 95[.]211.189.46
- 95[.]211.189.47
Tip: 85 related IOCs (24 IP, 59 domain, 0 URL, 2 email, 0 file hash) to this threat have been found.
Overlaps
Source: ClearSky - October 2019
Detection (four cases): documentsfilesharing[.]cloud, mobile-messengerplus[.]network, mobilecontinue[.]network, sessions-identifier-memberemailid[.]network
Hint: Overlaps are extracted automatically by examining the IOCs associated with all indexed threats and actors.
FAQs
The Return of The Charming Kitten Phishing Campaign
A sophisticated phishing campaign named "The Return of The Charming Kitten" targeted high-profile individuals to steal their email login credentials and two-step verification codes. Attackers deceived their victims by sending fabricated security alerts and fake file-sharing links.
The attacks are attributed to "Charming Kitten," a hacking group supported by the Iranian government. The group is believed to have close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is known for orchestrating state-aligned cyber infiltration operations.
The core nature of the attack is espionage and intelligence gathering. By secretly infiltrating accounts, the attackers sought to monitor targets' real-time email communications to collect sensitive information surrounding international policies.
The hackers rapidly built up a robust infrastructure, establishing more than 20 malicious domains in a short window between September and November 2018. They disseminated phishing links across a wide array of platforms, including direct emails and hacked accounts on Twitter, Telegram, and Facebook.
The attackers specifically targeted non-Iranian political authorities, civil and human rights activists, journalists, and those involved in economic and military sanctions against Iran. The campaign focused heavily on American and Israeli citizens, with a clear objective to compromise their personal Yahoo! and Gmail accounts.
The attackers gathered intelligence to profile their targets and sent personalized messages containing fake Google Drive links or security warnings. When a victim entered their password on a convincing fake login page, the hackers verified it instantly and then prompted the user to hand over their two-factor authentication code.
The targets influence or are actively involved in international policies, sanctions, and media narratives that directly affect the Iranian government. Infiltrating these accounts provides the attackers with valuable strategic insights into the activities and communications of those challenging Iran's interests.
Individuals should transition away from standard text message verification and use physical Security Keys, such as YubiKeys, for robust account protection. Furthermore, users should never click on links in suspicious alerts and should instead review account security by navigating directly to their email provider's settings.
This campaign represents a highly targeted threat. The attackers carefully studied each victim prior to the attack, customizing their approach based on the individual's geographic location, cyber knowledge, contacts, and work schedule.