Threats Feed|Seedworm|Last Updated 11/03/2026|AuthorCertfa Radar|Publish Date05/03/2026

Iranian APT Seedworm Targets U.S., Israel, and Canada with Novel Backdoors

  • Actor Motivations: Espionage,Exfiltration
  • Attack Vectors: Backdoor,Downloader,Malware
  • Attack Complexity: Medium
  • Threat Risk: High Impact/High Probability

Threat Overview

The Iranian APT group Seedworm has targeted multiple organizations across the U.S., Canada, and Israel since February 2026. Leveraging custom malware, the threat actors compromised networks within the financial, aviation, software, defense, and non-profit sectors. Attackers deployed a novel JavaScript/TypeScript backdoor named Dindoor, alongside a Python-based backdoor called Fakeset. To evade detection, the group signed their payloads with digital certificates issued to "Amy Cherne" and "Donald Gay." Additionally, the attackers utilized legitimate cloud services, including Backblaze for staging and Rclone for attempted data exfiltration to Wasabi buckets. Given Seedworm’s affiliation with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, these intrusions pose a significant espionage threat amidst current geopolitical conflicts.

Detected Targets

TypeDescriptionConfidence
SectorBanking
Verified
SectorInformation Technology
Verified
SectorAerospace
Verified
SectorCivic
Verified
RegionCanada
Verified
RegionUnited States
Verified

Extracted IOCs

  • moonzonet[.]com
  • serialmenot[.]com
  • uppdatefile[.]com
  • 077ab28d66abdafad9f5411e18d26e87fe43da1410ee8fe846bd721ab0cb52de
  • 0f9cf1cf8d641562053ce533aaa413754db88e60404cab6bbaa11f2b2491d542
  • 1319d474d19eb386841732c728acf0c5fe64aa135101c6ceee1bd0369ecf97b6
  • 15061036c702ad92b56b35e42cf5dc334597e7311e98d2fdd3815a69ac3b1d84
  • 1d984d4b2b508b56a77c9a567fb7a50c858e672d56e8cf7677a1fca5c98c95d1
  • 24857fe82f454719cd18bcbe19b0cfa5387bee1022008b7f5f3a8be9f05e4d14
  • 2a00705cfd3c15cf8913e9eb4e23968efd06f1feceaef9987d26c5518887d043
  • 2a09bbb3d1ddb729ea7591f197b5955453aa3769c6fb98a5ef60c6e4b7df23a5
  • 2b7d8a519f44d3105e9fde2770c75efb933994c658855dca7d48c8b4897f81e6
  • 3df9dcc45d2a3b1f639e40d47eceeafb229f6d9e7f0adcd8f1731af1563ffb90
  • 42a5db2a020155b2adb77c00cbe6c6ad27c2285d8c6114679d9d34137e870b3f
  • 4aef998e3b3f6ca21c78ed71732c9d2bdcc8a4e0284f51d7462c79d446fbc7be
  • 64263640a6fdeb2388bca2e9094a17065308cf8dcb0032454c0a71d9b78327eb
  • 64cf334716f15da1db7981fad6c81a640d94aa1d65391ef879f4b7b6edf6e7f1
  • 7467f326677a4a2c8576e71a832e297e794ea00e9b67c4fcbe78b5aec697cec4
  • 74db1f653da6de134bdc526412a517a30b6856de9c3e5d0c742cb5fe9959ad0d
  • 7c30c16e7a311dc0cdb1cdfd9ea6e502f44c027328dbe7d960b9bcd85ccf5eef
  • 94f05495eb1b2ebe592481e01d3900615040aa02bd1807b705a50e45d7c53444
  • a4bd1371fe644d7e6898045cc8e7b5e1562bdfd0e4871d46034e29a22dec6377
  • a5d4d6be3bfe0cba23fe6b44984b5fc9c7c7e10030be96120bb30da0f2545d4c
  • a92d28f1d32e3a9ab7c3691f8bfca8f7586bb0666adbba47eab3e1a8faf7ecc0
  • b0af82de672d81f3c2f153977923b3884a8a9e7045b182c2379b19a1996931a0
  • bd8203ab88983bc081545ff325f39e9c5cd5eb6a99d04ae2a6cf862535c9829a
  • c7cf1575336e78946f4fe4b0e7416b6ebe6813a1a040c54fb6ad82e72673478e
  • ddceade244c636435f2444cd4c4d3dc161981f3af1f622c03442747ecef50888
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Tip: 28 related IOCs (0 IP, 3 domain, 0 URL, 0 email, 25 file hash) to this threat have been found.

FAQs

Seedworm Cyber Campaign Targeting U.S. and Israeli Networks

Security researchers disrupted a cyber espionage campaign targeting several organizations across North America and Israel. Attackers breached these networks, deployed custom hidden backdoors, and attempted to steal organizational data using cloud storage services.

The attacks were carried out by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known as Seedworm (also referred to as MuddyWater). Operating since 2017, this group is a subordinate element of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and is highly known for conducting classic espionage and intelligence gathering.

The primary goal of this campaign was espionage and information theft. By establishing a hidden presence on these networks prior to recent geopolitical hostilities, the threat actors positioned themselves to quietly gather sensitive intelligence or potentially launch further disruptive attacks.

Yes. The attackers focused on high-value targets, including a U.S. bank, a U.S. airport, non-profit organizations in both the U.S. and Canada, and the Israeli branch of a U.S. software company that supplies the defense and aerospace industries.

The attackers used specialized, custom-built malware (named Dindoor and Fakeset) to create backdoors into the targeted systems. To bypass security software, they disguised their malware using stolen or fraudulent digital certificates and used legitimate cloud services—like Backblaze for downloading tools and Wasabi for attempting to smuggle data out.

Entities like defense suppliers, banks, and critical infrastructure (such as airports) possess highly sensitive intellectual property, strategic operational data, and financial records. This makes them prime targets for state-sponsored groups looking to gain an economic or military advantage.

While Seedworm has broadened its focus globally in recent years to include various sectors across multiple continents, this specific campaign was highly targeted at a select few organizations in specific regions.

Organizations should check their systems for the specific fraudulent digital certificates used in this attack, tightly monitor the use of programming runtimes like Python and Deno, and restrict unauthorized data transfer tools from connecting to external cloud storage buckets.