Threats Feed

This Proofpoint report details the escalating targeting of journalists and media organisations by state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs). The report highlights how groups linked to China (TA412, TA459), North Korea (TA404), Iran (TA453, TA456, TA457), and Turkey (TA482) are using a variety of methods, including phishing emails with malicious attachments or web beacons for reconnaissance and social media credential harvesting, to achieve their intelligence and propaganda goals. The report highlights the persistent nature of the threat, the variety of tactics used, and the importance of enhanced security measures for journalists to protect their sources and the integrity of their reporting. Ultimately, it aims to raise awareness of this specific cybersecurity threat and encourage proactive protection measures within the media sector.

AttackIQ has released attack graphs emulating OilRig’s operations against global sectors, based on reports from Mandiant, Intezer, and Palo Alto Networks. The 2020 social media phishing campaign used LinkedIn to distribute malicious documents, leading to the Tonedeaf backdoor installation, persistence via scheduled tasks, and credential dumping with tools like LaZagne. The 2018 QuadAgent campaign targeted technology service providers and government agencies with PowerShell malware, establishing persistence, and utilizing multi-channel command-and-control communication, including SSL, HTTP, and DNS.

APT34's Saitama Agent employs a spear phishing email with a malicious Excel attachment to deliver malware using unique DNS tunneling and stateful programming techniques. The Excel document contains a VBA macro that hides its activities and communicates with the C2 server using DNS requests. The macro checks for mouse connections, drops multiple files, and uses a scheduled task for persistence. The campaign appears to be targeting Jordan, leveraging a Jordanian government ministry's logo to deceive victims.

The Iranian SiameseKitten (Lyceum) group deployed new malware masquerading as an Adobe update, communicating with a command and control server. The malware includes a reverse shell and employs fake Microsoft certificates, echoing tactics seen with other Iranian groups like Phosphorus. The attack involved a lure PDF related to drone attacks in Iran, aiming to establish persistence via the Startup folder. The parent file and reverse shell were downloaded from domains registered on June 6th, highlighting the group's continued use of sophisticated detection avoidance techniques.

The MuddyWater threat group has been conducting a long-term infection campaign targeting Middle East countries since the last quarter of 2020. The campaign utilizes a malicious Word document containing VBA macros wrapped in a compressed file to compromise victims' systems. The VBA macros drop a concise VBS script, which functions as a small RAT, allowing the execution of commands via cmd and communication with a C2 server using HTTP GET and POST requests. The targeted countries include Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Syria, Israel, Bahrain, Turkey, South Africa, Sudan, and others in the Middle East region.

This report from Check Point Research details an Iranian spear-phishing campaign targeting high-profile former Israeli and US officials. According to Check Point, the high-profile targets of this operation include Tzipi Livni, former Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister; a former major general in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) who held a highly sensitive position; the chairman of a leading Israeli security think tank; a former US ambassador to Israel; the former chairman of a prominent Middle East research centre; and a senior executive in the Israeli defence industry. The attackers used sophisticated techniques, including email thread hijacking and a custom URL shortener, to trick victims into revealing sensitive information. A legitimate identity verification service was also exploited to steal identity documents. The report analyses the attack infrastructure, methods and possible attribution to the Iran-linked Phosphorus APT group, suggesting a motive that may be linked to escalating geopolitical tensions between Iran and Israel. The ultimate goal appears to be access to victims' inboxes and personally identifiable information (PII), although the possibility of physical harm is also considered.

POLONIUM, suspected to be coordinating with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, is actively targeting Israeli organizations across multiple sectors such as critical manufacturing, IT, and defense. The group exploits supply chain vulnerabilities by compromising IT companies to further target downstream organizations like aviation companies and law firms. TTPs include custom implants like CreepyDrive that use cloud services for C2 and data exfiltration. MSTIC also notes overlap with Iranian groups MERCURY, CopyKittens, both in targeted victims and techniques like using AirVPN and OneDrive. Though unconfirmed, around 80% of victims were observed running Fortinet appliances, suggesting a potential CVE-2018-13379 exploitation.

Deep Instinct researchers detected suspicious activity in a Southern U.S. infrastructure and construction company, revealing an attempted compromise of an Exchange server by an Iranian APT, PHOSPHORUS. Seven exploitation attempts were made, including installation of a root certificate and blending malicious traffic with legitimate. The attacker used malware to create a new user account, setup RDP access, and establish a reverse proxy to connect to the compromised system. A new evasion technique, involving masking malicious domains within legitimate ones, was also detected. PHOSPHORUS activities can be traced back to June 2020.

The Iranian APT group ENT-11, also known as MuddyWater, has been using a variant of the PowGoop malware, dubbed "E400", targeting foreign governments, telecommunications, energy sectors, intergovernmental economic cooperation organizations, and the banking sector, primarily in the Middle East. Insights from NTT Security revealed dozens of PowGoop command and control servers dating back to October 2020. The group appears to be winding down operations with the E400-PowGoop variant, but it is expected to continue modifying its tools and creating new variants.

In early February 2022, the TunnelVision threat actor exploited a vulnerable VMware Horizon server using the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) to gain unauthorized access. The attack involved suspicious account creation, credential harvesting, and lateral movement using PSexec and RDP. The adversaries also harvested credentials using Procdump and downloaded Sysinternals and SSH tools. The intrusion was attributed to the Iranian-aligned TunnelVision activity cluster, based on observed TTPs and artifacts. The targeted sectors and countries are not specified in the report.

The Iranian cyber espionage group UNC3313, also known as TEMP.Zagros and MuddyWater, has been identified as the perpetrator of a series of cyber attacks on Middle Eastern government and technology entities. The group used new targeted malware, GRAMDOOR and STARWHALE, to exploit vulnerabilities and gain unauthorized access. UNC3313 also utilized publicly available remote access software and modified open-source offensive security tools for lateral movement within the targeted systems. The group's activities suggest a strong focus on geopolitical targets and the telecommunications sector in the Middle East. The use of the Telegram API for command and control allows for malicious traffic to blend in with legitimate user behavior, indicating the group's efforts to evade detection.

The Iranian government-sponsored APT group, MuddyWater, has been conducting cyber operations against government and private sector organizations across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. The targeted sectors include telecommunications, defense, local government, oil and natural gas. MuddyWater's campaigns involve the exploitation of public vulnerabilities, usage of open-source tools, spear-phishing, and the deployment of multiple types of malware such as PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy/Starwhale, Mori, and POWERSTATS. The group has been active since 2018 and is known for maintaining persistence on victim networks and obfuscating PowerShell scripts to hide C2 functions.

Iranian APT group Phosphorus has developed a new PowerShell backdoor, dubbed PowerLess Backdoor, for espionage purposes. Cybereason researchers discovered the backdoor while investigating the group's exploitation of the ProxyShell vulnerability. The backdoor allows for downloading additional payloads, evasive PowerShell execution, and encrypted communication with the command and control server. Connections were also found between the Phosphorus group and the Memento Ransomware.

The Iranian APT group Moses Staff deployed a new, previously undocumented Remote Access Trojan (RAT) called StrifeWater for its cyber-espionage and disruption operations. The StrifeWater RAT has been used in initial attack stages, demonstrating various capabilities like listing system files, executing system commands, creating persistence, and downloading updates. Post-infection, it's replaced with ransomware not for financial gain but to disrupt operations and inflict system damage. Victims of these attacks span globally across countries like Israel, Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, UAE, and the US.

The MuddyWater threat group continues to evolve its tactics and techniques. The group exploits publicly available offensive security tools and has been refining its custom toolset to avoid detection. It utilizes the PowGoop malware family, tunneling tools, and targets Exchange servers in high-profile organizations, particularly governmental entities and telecommunication companies in the Middle East. The group has also been observed exploiting CVE-2020-0688 and using Ruler for its malicious activities.

APT35 has started widespread scanning and attempts to leverage the Log4j flaw in publicly facing systems only four days after the vulnerability was disclosed. The group used a modular PowerShell-based framework dubbed CharmPower for persistence, information gathering, and command execution.

An espionage campaign tentatively linked to the Iranian-backed Seedworm group has been using compromised organizations as stepping stones to additional victims or targets that may have been compromised solely to perform supply-chain-type attacks on other organizations. The attackers primarily used legitimate tools, publicly available malware, and living-off-the-land tactics, with a significant interest in Exchange Servers. While the ultimate end goal remains unknown, the focus on telecom operators suggests the attackers are gathering intelligence on the sector, potentially pivoting into communications surveillance.

SafeBreach Labs discovered an Iranian threat actor exploiting the MSHTML vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to infect Farsi-speaking victims with the PowerShortShell stealer via spear phishing. The attack, first reported in September 2021, involved a malicious Word document connecting to a server, downloading a DLL, and executing a PowerShell script. This script collected data, including screenshots and files, and exfiltrated it to the attacker's server. The campaign targeted Iranians abroad, particularly in the United States, suggesting ties to Iran's Islamic regime.

Some Iranian government-sponsored APT groups have exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange servers and Fortinet devices since March 2021. These actors broadly targeted critical infrastructure sectors in the US, including Transportation and Healthcare and Public Health, as well as Australian organizations. The APT group focused more on exploiting known vulnerabilities rather than specific sectors, using the gained access for ransomware deployment, data exfiltration, and extortion. Several tactics, techniques, and tools were utilized, including creating new user accounts and modifying Task Scheduler.

APT35 has used multiple tactics to compromise high-value targets. The group has used hijacked websites, such as one affiliated with a UK university, for credential phishing attacks. They have also uploaded spyware disguised as VPN software to app stores and impersonated conference officials to conduct phishing campaigns. Additionally, APT35 has utilized link shorteners and click trackers embedded within PDF files and abused services like Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages. The group has adopted a novel approach by leveraging Telegram for real-time operator notifications, enabling them to monitor visitor information to their phishing sites.

The Lyceum group (also known as Hexane) is a cyber threat actor focused on the telecommunications, energy and aviation sectors, particularly targeting high-profile organisations in Tunisia. Active since 2018, Lyceum has recently replaced its .NET-based malware with new C++ backdoors and PowerShell scripts to evade detection. The group continues to rely on DNS tunneling for command and control (C2) and uses tools for system reconnaissance, credential theft and keylogging. Lyceum also uses spoofed domains to disguise its activities, demonstrating an adaptive approach to persistent targeting of critical infrastructure.

The Iranian APT group MalKamak has been targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies in the Middle East since at least 2018, with additional victims in the US, Russia and Europe. The group uses ShellClient, a newly discovered remote access trojan (RAT), to conduct highly targeted cyberattacks. ShellClient uses Dropbox, a popular cloud-based service, for command and control (C2) operations, replacing the group's previous C2 infrastructure.

Operation GhostShell is a cyber espionage campaign targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies, primarily in the Middle East, with victims in the U.S., Russia and Europe. The operation, carried out by the Iranian group MalKamak, uses a stealthy, evolving remote access trojan (RAT) called ShellClient, which has been in development since 2018. ShellClient evades detection through masquerading, AES encryption and WMI-based reconnaissance. The attackers used tools such as PAExec for lateral movement and lsa.exe for credential dumping. Data exfiltration was facilitated by using WinRar to compress stolen information before sending it via Dropbox.