Threats Feed

The Iranian APT group MalKamak has been targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies in the Middle East since at least 2018, with additional victims in the US, Russia and Europe. The group uses ShellClient, a newly discovered remote access trojan (RAT), to conduct highly targeted cyberattacks. ShellClient uses Dropbox, a popular cloud-based service, for command and control (C2) operations, replacing the group's previous C2 infrastructure.

Operation GhostShell is a cyber espionage campaign targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies, primarily in the Middle East, with victims in the U.S., Russia and Europe. The operation, carried out by the Iranian group MalKamak, uses a stealthy, evolving remote access trojan (RAT) called ShellClient, which has been in development since 2018. ShellClient evades detection through masquerading, AES encryption and WMI-based reconnaissance. The attackers used tools such as PAExec for lateral movement and lsa.exe for credential dumping. Data exfiltration was facilitated by using WinRar to compress stolen information before sending it via Dropbox.

The Iranian APT group Siamesekitten (Lyceum/Hexane) launched targeted cyberattacks on Israeli IT and technology firms in 2021 using advanced social engineering and supply chain tactics. The campaign impersonated HR personnel and organizations via phishing websites and LinkedIn profiles to distribute malware such as Milan and its successor Shark. Victims were infected with DanBot RAT through DNS tunneling and HTTPS C2 communication. The group also exploited legitimate tools like UltraVNC for remote access. Known for prior attacks on oil, gas, and telecom sectors in the Middle East and Africa, Siamesekitten’s recent focus highlights its shift to Israeli targets for espionage and data theft.

The report from Proofpoint outlines a complex social engineering and malware campaign that appears to have been conducted by an actor aligned with the Iranian state, believed to be TA456. Over several years, TA456 used a fake social media persona, "Marcella Flores," to build a relationship with an employee of an aerospace defense contractor. The aim was to infect the target's computer with the LEMPO malware, designed for reconnaissance and data exfiltration. This campaign serves to illustrate TA456's persistence and advanced social engineering tactics, targeting smaller contractors with the ultimate goal of eventually compromising larger defense firms.

Tortoiseshell targeted military personnel and companies in the defense and aerospace industries, primarily in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the UK and Europe. The group used social engineering, phishing, and custom malware tools, including Syskit and a Liderc-like reconnaissance tool, to compromise and profile victims' systems. The campaign involved fake online personas, spoofed domains, and outsourced malware development to Tehran-based IT company Mahak Rayan Afraz (MRA), which has ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian-state aligned actor TA453 has been covertly targeting individuals of intelligence interest to the Iranian government by masquerading as British scholars from the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The threat actor, targeted Middle Eastern experts, senior professors, and journalists. TA453 compromised a legitimate academic website to deliver personalized credential harvesting pages.

The article from Check Point Research focuses on the resurgence of Iran's APT34 cyber espionage group, which has updated its tactics and tools. This group, also known as OilRig, has targeted a Lebanese entity using a new backdoor variant named "SideTwist". They have refined their strategies to evade detection, continuing their pattern of using job opportunity documents to deliver malware through LinkedIn. The article provides an in-depth analysis of the infection chain, the malware's capabilities, and its persistence techniques. It aligns with APT34's history of targeting Middle Eastern entities, underscoring the ongoing cyber threats in the region.

In late 2020, the Iranian-nexus threat actor TA453 launched a credential phishing campaign called BadBlood, targeting senior medical professionals in genetic, neurology, and oncology research in the United States and Israel. The campaign deviates from the group's usual activity and may indicate a shift in TA453's targeting priorities. The attackers used spearphishing emails with links to a fake OneDrive site to harvest user credentials, potentially to exfiltrate email contents or use compromised accounts for further phishing campaigns.

In December 2021, PHOSPHORUS exploited the Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities, using web shells to gain initial access and execute code. The attack closely resembled their previous attacks and due to previous reports and OSINT research, DFIR believes with medium to high confidence that this intrusion would have ended in ransomware. The attackers established persistence through scheduled tasks and a newly created account, and after enumerating the environment, disabled LSA protection and dumped LSASS process memory. The entire attack was likely scripted out, as evidenced by the user agent strings and the similarity between commands.

The MuddyWater threat group, through an intrusion set named Earth Vetala, targeted various organizations in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The group used spear-phishing emails to distribute malicious packages, predominantly aiming at Government Agencies, Academia, and the Tourism sector. MuddyWater deployed post-exploitation tools to dump passwords and establish a persistent presence within targeted systems. They used multiple C&C servers to execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts and were persistent in attempting multiple techniques to establish connectivity despite repeated failures.

The cyberespionage group, Static Kitten, launched a cyber attack primarily targeting the government sectors of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait. Using geopolitical lures and masquerading as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Kuwait, the attackers aimed to install a remote management tool called ScreenConnect on victims' devices. The campaign involved phishing emails, URL masquerading, and delivering ZIP files that purport to contain relevant documents but instead initiate the ScreenConnect installation process.

During the 2021 Christmas holidays, Iranian state-backed hackers Charming Kitten initiated a targeted phishing campaign against individuals, focusing on personal and business emails. The group used public-facing applications, such as Google services, to redirect victims through a chain of legitimate services, helping bypass security layers in email services and obfuscate their operations. They employed various fake domains and developed custom phishing pages to target a range of online services, collecting sensitive data and emails from victims.

The ReversingLabs analysis, based on an FBI report, reveals that the Iranian-backed APT39 (Rana Corp) is using Android malware for state-sponsored surveillance, primarily targeting individuals deemed a threat by the Iranian government. The malware exploits smartphone features such as the camera and microphone to spy on users. It can intercept SMS, record audio, take photos and manipulate network connections. Obfuscation techniques were used, but analysis of an older sample revealed key capabilities for remote monitoring and control. The malware specifically monitors Iranian messaging apps, suggesting domestic surveillance. Targeted sectors include political dissidents and individuals of interest within Iran.

The Iranian threat actor Phosphorus targeted potential attendees of the Munich Security Conference and the Think 20 (T20) Summit in Saudi Arabia through a series of cyberattacks. The attackers sent spoofed email invitations to former government officials, policy experts, academics, and leaders from non-governmental organizations. Their goal was intelligence collection, and they successfully compromised several high-profile individuals' accounts.

The espionage group Seedworm (aka MuddyWater) has been actively targeting government organizations, telecoms, and computer services sectors across the Middle East, including Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Afghanistan, Israel, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Seedworm's recent activities, linked to the PowGoop tool, involve PowerShell usage, credential dumping, and DLL side-loading. The group establishes connections to its infrastructure using Secure Sockets Funneling and Chisel while deploying PowGoop through remote execution tools. The connection between PowGoop and Seedworm remains tentative, suggesting potential retooling.

In September 2020, the Iranian threat actor MuddyWater launched "Operation Quicksand," as reported by the ClearSky cybersecurity company. This operation targeted Israeli organizations and others across the Middle East and North Africa, aiming to deploy a destructive variant of Thanos ransomware through "PowGoop," a malicious loader disguised as a Google update DLL. By employing spear-phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, and using sophisticated malware delivery mechanisms, the campaign focused on destructive attacks rather than financial gain, marking a significant shift in MuddyWater's operational intent from espionage to more aggressive tactics.

Silent Librarian (aka TA407/COBALT DICKENS) has resumed its annual spearphishing campaign targeting universities worldwide for the 2020-2021 academic year. The group seeks to steal research and intellectual property using phishing websites that mimic legitimate university domains. Recent campaigns have featured domains with altered top-level domains such as ".me", ".tk" and ".cf", often hosted via Cloudflare to disguise the true origin, which includes servers based in Iran. This follows their indictment by the US Department of Justice in 2018 for cyber attacks on academic institutions worldwide.

The Lyceum APT targets the oil, gas and telecommunications sectors in the Middle East, focusing on credential theft and network infiltration through a multi-stage attack chain. The initial infection involves malicious Microsoft Office documents that deploy DanDrop, a VBA-based malware dropper that installs DanBot, a remote access Trojan used for ongoing control. The group also uses PowerShell scripts, including keyloggers and credential decryption tools, to gather sensitive data from Active Directory and RDCMan configurations. The sophisticated attack chain used by this cybercrime group highlights the ongoing threat to critical infrastructure in the Middle East.

Microsoft reports that the Iranian APT group MERCURY (aka MuddyWater) is actively exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to compromise Active Directory services. Known for targeting Middle Eastern governments for data exfiltration, MERCURY has also exploited the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604) to implant web shells for persistent access. These attacks often involve Cobalt Strike payloads and lateral movement within networks, focusing on domain controllers. Despite patches released in 2020, exploitation attempts remain widespread, highlighting the need for robust patch management. MERCURY's activities highlight the ongoing threat to governments and other critical sectors in the Middle East.

Rana Intelligence Computing Company (APT39) is an Iranian front group for the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) that conducts cyber operations in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. Its primary targets include the travel, telecommunications, hospitality, academic, and government sectors. Rana used malware delivered via spearphishing, using Visual Basic, PowerShell, AutoIt scripts and BITS malware to steal data, track individuals and maintain persistence. Their campaign targeted over 15 US companies, using scheduled tasks, encryption and obfuscation techniques to evade detection. Rana also deployed Android malware with root access capabilities for C2 communications, audio recording, and photo capture.

In April 2020, Iran-based threat actor TRACER KITTEN targeted a telecommunications company in the EMEA region, leveraging valid credentials and custom backdoors for persistent access and C2 communications. The adversary employed SSH tunnels, masqueraded tools, and rogue Windows services to evade detection. Credential theft attempts involved LSASS dumps via comsvcs.dll and a modified Mimikatz. Reconnaissance was extensive, using native Windows tools to enumerate users, groups, and services, followed by a pass-the-hash attempt with Invoke-TheHash. Early detection allowed defenders to mitigate potential data exfiltration.

IBM's X-Force team has detailed a new destructive malware, ZeroCleare, targeting the energy sector in the Middle East. The wiper, similar to Shamoon, overwrites data and maliciously uses legitimate tools. Attribution points to Iranian state-sponsored groups, possibly a collaboration between ITG13 and another entity. The report highlights the increase in destructive attacks, particularly in the energy sector, and offers mitigation strategies, including the use of threat intelligence, robust security controls and effective backup systems. Finally, it notes the wider geopolitical implications of such attacks.

Iranian APT groups, notably APT34 and APT33, have exploited the CVE-2017-11774 vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook, using it for espionage and destructive attacks. This exploit involves modifying Outlook's homepage settings via the registry to achieve persistence and remote code execution, bypassing Microsoft's patch. The attacks have targeted sectors globally, leveraging custom phishing documents and Azure-hosted payloads to bypass security measures and maintain control over compromised systems.