Threats Feed

In September 2020, the Iranian threat actor MuddyWater launched "Operation Quicksand," as reported by the ClearSky cybersecurity company. This operation targeted Israeli organizations and others across the Middle East and North Africa, aiming to deploy a destructive variant of Thanos ransomware through "PowGoop," a malicious loader disguised as a Google update DLL. By employing spear-phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, and using sophisticated malware delivery mechanisms, the campaign focused on destructive attacks rather than financial gain, marking a significant shift in MuddyWater's operational intent from espionage to more aggressive tactics.

Microsoft reports that the Iranian APT group MERCURY (aka MuddyWater) is actively exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to compromise Active Directory services. Known for targeting Middle Eastern governments for data exfiltration, MERCURY has also exploited the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604) to implant web shells for persistent access. These attacks often involve Cobalt Strike payloads and lateral movement within networks, focusing on domain controllers. Despite patches released in 2020, exploitation attempts remain widespread, highlighting the need for robust patch management. MERCURY's activities highlight the ongoing threat to governments and other critical sectors in the Middle East.

The Iranian APT group MuddyWater has expanded its tactics, targeting government, telecommunications and military sectors in countries such as Tajikistan, Pakistan and Iraq. New campaigns include decoy documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 and malicious VBA macros, with second-stage payloads downloaded from compromised servers. Primary targets have impersonated entities in the region surrounding Iran, including Iraqi and Pakistani organisations. The group also uses RATs for process detection, using obfuscation techniques such as Base64 encoding and JavaScript layers. Compromised servers in Pakistan and China facilitated these operations, demonstrating MuddyWater's sophisticated arsenal and focus on espionage.

The Iranian APT group, MuddyWater, targeted Kurdish political groups and Turkish defense sector organizations using emails with malicious Word documents. The documents contained embedded Macros that used PowerShell to execute various commands and modify registry values for persistence. The Macro also used obfuscation techniques, encoding data within image files and a document. The attackers tested their malicious documents against various anti-virus engines, uploading files from Germany and Iraq. This campaign signifies an evolution in MuddyWater's attack methods, with malware extraction now performed locally rather than via a C2 server.

Seedworm has compromised more than 130 victims across 30 organizations since September 2018. The group targets primarily the Middle East, Europe, and North America, focusing on government agencies, oil and gas companies, NGOs, telecoms, and IT firms. Seedworm uses tools such as Powermud, Powemuddy, and PowerShell scripts and has updated its tactics to avoid detection. The main targeted sectors include telecommunications, IT services, oil and gas, universities, and embassies. The group is known for its speed and agility in obtaining actionable intelligence from targeted organizations.

The MuddyWater threat group has been launching two-stage spear-phishing attacks on targets in Lebanon and Oman. The first stage involves sending macro-embedded documents posing as resumes or official letters. These documents contain obfuscated code hosted on compromised domains. In the second stage, obfuscated source code from these domains is executed to propagate MuddyWater's main PowerShell backdoor, POWERSTATS. This campaign marks a shift from single-stage to two-stage attacks, allowing for stealthier delivery of the payload.

The MuddyWater group has expanded its cyber operations, focusing mainly on government bodies, military entities, telecommunication companies, and educational institutions. The new spear-phishing docs used by MuddyWater rely on social engineering to persuade users to enable macros, thereby initiating malware extraction and execution. The malware is designed for extensive system reconnaissance, and the command-and-control communication structure allows the threat actors to accept or reject victims based on various criteria.

A potential MuddyWater campaign has been discovered using a new sample found in May 2018. The campaign involves a malicious Microsoft Word document with an embedded macro capable of executing PowerShell scripts, leading to a PRB-Backdoor payload. Notably, the lure document's subject matter has changed from government or telecommunications-related documents to rewards or promotions, suggesting that targets may no longer be limited to specific industries or organizations. The backdoor communicates with a C&C server to perform various functions, such as gathering system information, keylogging, and capturing screenshots.

This report investigates the PRB-Backdoor, a powerful and multifunctional piece of malware suspected to be associated with the MuddyWater group. The malware is deployed via a macro-enabled Word document, utilizing PowerShell scripts for execution. It employs obfuscation techniques to conceal its activities and communicates with a command and control server over HTTP. The backdoor has a plethora of functionalities, including keylogging, screen capturing, system information collection, and password theft. The backdoor seems to be new and unique, with no references found in any public source.

The MuddyWater or Temp.Zagros group has resumed its activities after a perceived quiet phase, with recent samples revealing additional obfuscation layers. The group continues to use PowerShell, targeting regions such as Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, with a potential focus on governmental sectors. The recent malicious documents include a new variant of the POWERSTATS backdoor, with anti-analysis and debugging features such as BSOD functionality. They have also included checks for security software and process names to impair defensive measures.

The Iran-affiliated threat actor, TEMP.Zagros, orchestrated a spear-phishing campaign from January to March 2018, primarily targeting individuals across Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and India. This actor leveraged malicious macro-based documents with geopolitical themes to install the POWERSTATS backdoor on victims' systems. The campaign exhibited evolving tactics over time, employing both VBS files and INF/SCT files to indirectly execute PowerShell commands. The installed malware demonstrated a range of functionalities, from system data extraction and screenshot capture to checks for security tools and remote command execution.

A new cyber-espionage campaign, bearing similarities to the earlier MuddyWater attacks, is targeting government organizations and telecommunication companies in Turkey, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The campaign uses spear-phishing tactics with malicious documents, leveraging social engineering to trick victims into enabling macros and activating payloads. Visual Basic and PowerShell scripts are used, with obfuscation techniques employed to evade detection. The attackers also use persistence methods and engage in system owner/user discovery, collecting system information and taking screenshots before sending this data to a command-and-control server.

The research team at Palo Alto Networks has discovered a group of targeted cyber-attacks against the Middle East region that occurred between February and October 2017, carried out by "MuddyWater". These attacks are espionage-related. The group used a PowerShell-based first-stage backdoor called "POWERSTATS", which evolved slowly over time, and targeted countries including the USA and India, as well as those within the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. The group also used GitHub to host its backdoor.

MuddyWater group continues its cyber-espionage operations, leveraging obfuscated PowerShell scripts within Word documents to infiltrate systems. These documents masquerade as legitimate entities, such as the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan. The tactics include sophisticated obfuscation techniques and a careful reconnaissance strategy, primarily focusing on the Middle East and Pakistan. The campaign deploys a variety of tools, including C&C servers and proxies, with a detailed focus on avoiding detection by analysis tools.