Threats Feed

Handala Hack, an Iranian MOIS-affiliated threat actor also tracked as Void Manticore, executes destructive wiping and hack-and-leak operations against targets in Israel, Albania, and the United States. They primarily target the government, telecommunications, and medical technology sectors. The group relies on compromised VPN accounts for initial access, subsequently moving laterally via RDP and the zero-trust mesh platform NetBird. Their hands-on attacks involve disabling Windows Defender and conducting extensive credential dumping via LSASS extraction and ADRecon. To maximize operational impact, Handala simultaneously deploys custom MBR and PowerShell wipers via Group Policy, leverages VeraCrypt for disk encryption, and manually deletes virtual machines, causing severe data destruction.

Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked threat actors, such as Void Manticore and MuddyWater, are actively integrating cybercriminal tools and affiliate networks into their state-sponsored operations. Moving beyond merely using cybercrime as a cover for deniability, these groups are leveraging commercial infostealers like Rhadamanthys, malware-as-a-service networks like CastleLoader, and the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) to enhance their operational reach and obfuscate attribution. Recent campaigns have targeted government and private sectors, including telecommunications, defense, energy, and medical facilities—across the Middle East, Israel, Albania, and the United States. Notably, these operations have utilized ransomware branding to execute destructive and extortion attacks against Israeli hospitals, fulfilling strategic state objectives through the criminal ecosystem.

Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked threat actors, such as Void Manticore and MuddyWater, are actively integrating cybercriminal tools and affiliate networks into their state-sponsored operations. Moving beyond merely using cybercrime as a cover for deniability, these groups are leveraging commercial infostealers like Rhadamanthys, malware-as-a-service networks like CastleLoader, and the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) to enhance their operational reach and obfuscate attribution. Recent campaigns have targeted government and private sectors, including telecommunications, defense, energy, and medical facilities—across the Middle East, Israel, Albania, and the United States. Notably, these operations have utilized ransomware branding to execute destructive and extortion attacks against Israeli hospitals, fulfilling strategic state objectives through the criminal ecosystem.

Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked threat actors, such as Void Manticore and MuddyWater, are actively integrating cybercriminal tools and affiliate networks into their state-sponsored operations. Moving beyond merely using cybercrime as a cover for deniability, these groups are leveraging commercial infostealers like Rhadamanthys, malware-as-a-service networks like CastleLoader, and the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) to enhance their operational reach and obfuscate attribution. Recent campaigns have targeted government and private sectors, including telecommunications, defense, energy, and medical facilities—across the Middle East, Israel, Albania, and the United States. Notably, these operations have utilized ransomware branding to execute destructive and extortion attacks against Israeli hospitals, fulfilling strategic state objectives through the criminal ecosystem.

Amid escalating geopolitical tensions, Iranian state-aligned and hacktivist threat groups, including MuddyWater, VoidManticore, APT42, APT35, and Infy, are actively pre-positioning infrastructure for cyber operations. By analyzing ASN patterns, TLS fingerprints, and hosting clusters, defenders can proactively track these adversaries. The groups deploy a mix of custom backdoors, public malware, and Cloudflare-fronted C2 servers to obscure their origins. Campaigns utilize spear-phishing, compromised government mailboxes, and modular scripts to target energy, financial, government, defense, and critical infrastructure sectors. Geographically, these operations focus heavily on the U.S., Israel, the MENA region, Oman, and the UAE, alongside targeting Iranian dissidents and global defense personnel.

Storm-842 (Void Manticore), linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), has conducted destructive cyberattacks targeting Albania and Israel. Using wiper malware and influence campaigns, the group disrupted Albanian e-government and border systems, targeting sectors like government and infrastructure, while aligning attacks with geopolitical events such as opposition conferences. Operations include exploiting vulnerabilities, deploying web shells, and credential harvesting, often in coordination with Scarred Manticore. The attacks incorporate ransomware-style encryptors, disk wipers, and data leaks through personas like “Homeland Justice” and “Karma,” showcasing a blend of technical and psychological tactics.

Void Manticore, an Iranian threat actor, executed destructive cyberattacks in Israel and Albania, targeting government sectors. They collaborated with Scarred Manticore, using CVE-2019-0604 for initial access, followed by custom tools like Foxshell and Liontail for command execution. The attacks involved data exfiltration and the deployment of wipers, including the custom BiBi wiper. The group employed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement and leveraged Domain Admin credentials for network control. Information leaks were disseminated through personas "Karma" and "Homeland Justice".

Void Manticore, an Iranian threat actor, executed destructive cyberattacks in Israel and Albania, targeting government sectors. They collaborated with Scarred Manticore, using CVE-2019-0604 for initial access, followed by custom tools like Foxshell and Liontail for command execution. The attacks involved data exfiltration and the deployment of wipers, including the custom BiBi wiper. The group employed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement and leveraged Domain Admin credentials for network control. Information leaks were disseminated through personas "Karma" and "Homeland Justice".

Void Manticore, an Iranian threat actor, executed destructive cyberattacks in Israel and Albania, targeting government sectors. They collaborated with Scarred Manticore, using CVE-2019-0604 for initial access, followed by custom tools like Foxshell and Liontail for command execution. The attacks involved data exfiltration and the deployment of wipers, including the custom BiBi wiper. The group employed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement and leveraged Domain Admin credentials for network control. Information leaks were disseminated through personas "Karma" and "Homeland Justice".

Void Manticore, an Iranian threat actor, executed destructive cyberattacks in Israel and Albania, targeting government sectors. They collaborated with Scarred Manticore, using CVE-2019-0604 for initial access, followed by custom tools like Foxshell and Liontail for command execution. The attacks involved data exfiltration and the deployment of wipers, including the custom BiBi wiper. The group employed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement and leveraged Domain Admin credentials for network control. Information leaks were disseminated through personas "Karma" and "Homeland Justice".