Threats Feed

Suspected Iranian threat actors, likely linked to APT35 (Agent Serpens), created a fraudulent website impersonating Germany’s Mega Model Agency to conduct targeted espionage. The site collects extensive visitor data—including IP addresses, browser fingerprints, and screen resolutions—using obfuscated JavaScript to enable selective targeting. A fake model profile and inactive album link suggest planned social engineering attacks. Although no victim interaction was confirmed, the infrastructure and tactics indicate preparation for spear phishing. The campaign targets dissidents, journalists, and activists abroad, especially in Germany, aligning with the group’s history of surveillance and influence operations against Iranian opposition figures.

Kaspersky has uncovered BellaCPP, a new C++ variant of the BellaCiao malware family, linked to the Charming Kitten threat actor. BellaCPP, found on an infected machine in Asia, features domain generation, XOR-encrypted string decryption, and SSH tunneling, with payloads stored in critical directories like C:\Windows\System32. It lacks a webshell, showing refined design. PDB paths reveal targeting details, highlighting evolving capabilities. These findings underscore the need for robust cybersecurity and thorough network scanning to combat such threats.

APT35 targeted the aerospace and semiconductor industries in the US, Thailand, UAE, and Israel using fake recruitment and corporate websites. These sites delivered malware via forged legitimate programs and malicious DLLs to compromise victims. The group leveraged platforms like GitHub, OneDrive, and Google Cloud for C&C communications and payload delivery. In a related attack, a semiconductor company was targeted using a VPN program laced with malicious components. Persistence mechanisms included registry modifications, while obfuscation techniques were used to evade detection. APT35’s activities are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran.

ClearSky Cyber Security's research details an Iranian cyber campaign, dubbed "Iranian Dream Job," using fake job postings to target the aerospace industry. The campaign, active since at least September 2023, employs the SnailResin malware, leading to the SlugResin backdoor. Attribution is complex, with potential links to both Iranian group TA455 (a Charming Kitten subgroup) and North Korea's Lazarus group, raising questions about potential collaboration or deception. The campaign leverages fake LinkedIn profiles and websites, distributing malware via seemingly legitimate ZIP files containing a malicious executable. This sophisticated attack uses social engineering and DLL side-loading for infiltration.

Charming Kitten has launched a new cyber campaign targeting NGOs and media organizations in Western and Middle Eastern countries. The campaign begins with initial contact via a Yahoo email, followed by a phishing link sent through WhatsApp. To build credibility, attackers may initiate silent WhatsApp voice calls before redirecting victims to a phishing site designed to mimic Google Meet. This page, hosted on Google Sites, employs an EventListener script to capture any entered data and send it to the attackers' server. Indicators of compromise include the domain atlanticcouncil[.]site and specific WhatsApp numbers.

Since June 2024, the Iranian-linked threat group Charming Kitten (APT42) has continued to build phishing infrastructure, identified as Cluster B, to target individuals perceived as threats to the Iranian regime, including researchers, journalists, NGO leaders, and human rights activists. The group registered several new domains, likely intended to host credential phishing pages that masquerade as Google, YouTube, and file-hosting service login portals. Past campaigns have targeted individuals in the U.S., Israel, and Europe, primarily in the research, media, and academic sectors. The phishing emails often contain malicious links disguised as conference invitations or legitimate documents.

Since June 2024, the Iranian-linked threat group Charming Kitten (APT42) has continued to build phishing infrastructure, identified as Cluster B, to target individuals perceived as threats to the Iranian regime, including researchers, journalists, NGO leaders, and human rights activists. The group registered several new domains, likely intended to host credential phishing pages that masquerade as Google, YouTube, and file-hosting service login portals. Past campaigns have targeted individuals in the U.S., Israel, and Europe, primarily in the research, media, and academic sectors. The phishing emails often contain malicious links disguised as conference invitations or legitimate documents.

Since June 2024, the Iranian-linked threat group Charming Kitten (APT42) has continued to build phishing infrastructure, identified as Cluster B, to target individuals perceived as threats to the Iranian regime, including researchers, journalists, NGO leaders, and human rights activists. The group registered several new domains, likely intended to host credential phishing pages that masquerade as Google, YouTube, and file-hosting service login portals. Past campaigns have targeted individuals in the U.S., Israel, and Europe, primarily in the research, media, and academic sectors. The phishing emails often contain malicious links disguised as conference invitations or legitimate documents.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten, an Iran nexus threat actor group, used the Sponsor backdoor to target 34 entities across Brazil, Israel, and UAE. Initial access was gained by exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855). The campaign targeted various sectors, including automotive, communications, engineering, financial services, healthcare, insurance, legal, manufacturing, retail, technology, and telecommunications. Sponsor backdoor, disguised as an updater program, used discreetly deployed batch files to evade detection. Charming Kitten also deployed tools like Plink, Merlin agent, Mimikatz, and Meterpreter reverse shells.

Charming Kitten has intensified its cyber espionage operations targeting Iranian dissidents, legal professionals, journalists, and human rights activists in Germany and abroad. According to the German BfV, the group uses detailed social engineering and spoofed online identities to initiate contact and build trust. Victims are lured into video calls via phishing links that mimic legitimate platforms like Google or Microsoft. These links lead to credential-harvesting sites, often intercepting two-factor authentication as well. Stolen credentials are then used to access cloud services and extract personal data using tools like Google Takeout.

The Iranian cyber-espionage group, Charming Kitten, targeted an individual who published an article about Iran. The attackers impersonated a reporter and carried out a series of seemingly benign interactions before sending a malicious RAR file containing the POWERSTAR backdoor. The backdoor, once executed, collects system information and communicates with a command-and-control server via encrypted channels. The attackers employ several modules for system reconnaissance, establishing persistence, and cleaning up forensic evidence. Notably, they leveraged the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) as a fallback mechanism for command-and-control communication.

Charming Kitten group's latest malware, BellaCiao, targets Microsoft Exchange servers across the United States, Europe, the Middle East (Turkey), and India. The malware uses a unique communication approach with its command-and-control infrastructure and is tailored to suit individual targets. BellaCiao is a dropper malware that delivers other payloads based on instructions from the C2 server. The initial infection vector is suspected to be Microsoft Exchange exploit chains, and the malware establishes persistence by masquerading as legitimate Microsoft Exchange server processes.

TA453, also known as Charming Kitten, has targeted sectors such as academia, defence, government, NGOs, think tanks and journalists in the UK and other regions of interest. The group uses spear phishing attacks, using open source reconnaissance to create tailored phishing emails. These emails are often sent from fake social media profiles or compromised email accounts. Once a relationship has been established, TA453 directs victims to malicious links or documents and steals credentials upon interaction. The group also exploits compromised email accounts to steal sensitive data, set up mail forwarding rules and facilitate further surveillance and future attacks.

The Iranian APT group, Charming Kitten (APT35), targets human rights activities, academia, media organizations, and political entities in the US and Central Eastern countries. Notable attacks include the 2017 HBO hack, which led to leaked unaired TV episodes, and interference attempts in the 2019 US elections, primarily targeting email accounts. Tools used by APT35 include DownPaper, which utilizes PowerShell and registry manipulation, Mimikatz for credential dumping, PsExec for remote execution, and PupyRAT for cross-platform control via phishing techniques.

This Certfa Lab report details the cyber espionage activities of Charming Kitten (APT42), an Iranian state-sponsored hacking group. The report focuses on four specific operations ("Alfa," "Bravo," "Charlie," and "Delta"), illustrating how Charming Kitten uses sophisticated social engineering, primarily impersonating prominent individuals on LinkedIn and Twitter, to build trust with targets before delivering malicious links disguised as innocuous meeting requests or research materials. The attacks consistently leverage phishing to steal credentials, targeting researchers, academics, activists, and journalists with a particular focus on the Middle East and North Africa. The report aims to raise public awareness of Charming Kitten's tactics and provide recommendations for enhancing online security, particularly emphasizing the use of multi-factor authentication.

This Certfa Lab report details the cyber espionage activities of Charming Kitten (APT42), an Iranian state-sponsored hacking group. The report focuses on four specific operations ("Alfa," "Bravo," "Charlie," and "Delta"), illustrating how Charming Kitten uses sophisticated social engineering, primarily impersonating prominent individuals on LinkedIn and Twitter, to build trust with targets before delivering malicious links disguised as innocuous meeting requests or research materials. The attacks consistently leverage phishing to steal credentials, targeting researchers, academics, activists, and journalists with a particular focus on the Middle East and North Africa. The report aims to raise public awareness of Charming Kitten's tactics and provide recommendations for enhancing online security, particularly emphasizing the use of multi-factor authentication.